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University of Utah  
 
 
INTEL AND COSTA RICA: A MODEL FOR GLOBAL 
EXPANSION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
 
 In this article, the myriad issues influencing Intel's worldwide expan-
sion into the global marketplace are examined. Because this topic is so 
broad in scope, discussion will focus on the strategic management poli-
cies implemented in the company’s 1995 decision to construct the Fabri-
cation plant, A6/T6, in Costa Rica. By analyzing the specific process and 
conditions of this incursion into Costa Rica, we can extrapolate a model 
that will serve to illuminate the strengths of Intel's organizational struc-
ture, processes, and strategies, and how they might apply to other global 
expansionary efforts. Similarly, we postulate a model for economic de-
velopment practiced by Costa Rica that sustained positive economic 
growth and development unique to the region. 
 This study will present the trade and investment environment, socio-
cultural factors, the political setting, and certain corporate competencies 
that came into play. We assess the value of this approach in Costa Rica as 
it might provide a basis for future global plans. Lastly we suggest a list of 
recommendations for maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of a 
company on a worldwide basis. One of the major points we underscore 
relates to the effectiveness of knowledge transfer and integration by a 
corporate headquarters to subsidiaries and plants as well as from these 
points of origin back to headquarters. If a corporation is truly versatile 
and knowledge flows in both directions, then it assumes transnational 
status, the ultimate in global efficiency. 
INTEL 
 Intel Corporation, considered the number one maker of computer 
chips, commands more than 80% of the PC microprocessor market, with 
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recent semi-annual revenues of $13.01 billion.1 The core business of Intel 
in microprocessors and chipsets for PCs and servers, falls under the in-
dustry rubric of semiconductors in the technology sector.2 Headquarters 
are housed in Santa Clara, California in the Silicon Valley technology 
cluster, although the corporation has subsidiaries around the globe. The 
geographic distribution of their organization is fairly comprehensive with 
regional scope, spanning the US and Canada,3 Europe,4 Pacific Asia,5 
Japan,6 and South America.7 The corporate centers within specific coun-
tries do not correspond directly to manufacturing plant locations. Never-
theless Intel achieves competitive positioning through the complex logis-
tical coordination of its global activities. 
 Intel fundamentals, underscored by Standard and Poors, principally 
pertain to ―its manufacturing prowess,‖ a major competitive advantage 
over its peers. Furthermore Intel has a demonstrated ability to ―penetrate 
the market for higher-end platforms, and leverage its web-based 
processes to reduce cost structure.‖ Hence Intel's core competencies re-
late to manufacturing and cost control, both of which are essential for 
competitors in the technology sector. Typically the market life cycle is 
short,8 just as research and development costs can be prohibitive in the 
break-neck pace of computer technology innovation. Costs must be con-
tained in order to maximize profits and retain market position. The recent 
precipitous drop in chip prices to an all-time low of $215 has shrunk 
margins considerably, though they are still higher then top rival AMD's 
chips that sell for $90-$125 a piece. Because products become obsolete 
quickly and margins are low, manufacturing acumen is essential in new 
product cycle innovations. 
                                                          
1For the 39 weeks ended 9/29/01, revenues fell 22% to $19.56 billion. Net income fell 
91% to $787 million.(Yahoo Market Guide Oct. 25, 01). $33.7 billion revenues in 2000 
(Annual Report).  
2Hoover’s describes the electronics and miscellaneous technology industry as one ―offering 
product lines of integrated circuits, microprocessors, logic devices, chipsets and memory 
chips for a wide variety of users, including telecom, computer, networking, wireless and 
other instrumentation.‖  
3Controlled under Intel headquarters in Santa Clara.  
4Intel Corporation UK Ltd., headquarters in UK and other branches in Israel, England, 
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and Russia.  
5Hong Kong base - Intel Semiconductor Ltd.  
6Ibaraki-ken, Intel Kabushiki Kaisha.  
7Brazil Intel Semiconductores do Brasil.  
8Moore’s Law - that speculates on the rapid growth and obsolescence in computers.  
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 Spreading costs around the globe is another key competitive advan-
tage of this corporation. The value is two-fold: the company consistently 
maximizes value by seeking low cost structures abroad for foreign direct 
investment in offshore sites, and Intel's global network of operations is 
flexible and responsive to integration of much of that local knowledge. 
The presence of wafer production plants in Israel and Ireland, an assem-
bly test plant in Malaysia and the Philippines, and an assembly and test 
plant for surface mount procedures in Costa Rica, facilitate Intel's access 
to the benefits from offshore locations as well as domestic wafer facili-
ties.9 The foreign countries where they operate have a similar profile: 
typically small, emerging economies with relatively high-skilled workers, 
lower cost factors, friendly tax structures, as well as stable governments. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 When Intel decided to open a Fabrication plant in Latin America in 
1995, the corporation researched the region in order to find the optimal 
location for its only plant. Several key demographic, political, geographic 
and socio-cultural determinants coupled with incentive plans presented by 
the Costa Rican government eventually lead to the projected $500 million 
total investment (by 2002) in San Jose. 
 There were four primary contenders in Latin America for the plant: 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile and Brasil. Harvard Business Professor Debo-
ra Spar, while working for a non-profit organization called the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), funded jointly by the World Bank 
and International Finance Corporation, submitted a report outlining the 
manner in which Costa Rica won over Intel. Her study examines the con-
tenders, yet outside of the Americas, Intel considered Taiwan and Singa-
pore as equally suited. Thus the fact that Costa Rica won the ―competi-
tion‖ is all the more revealing concerning the new paradigm countries 
will have to follow in order to vie for foreign direct investment and the 
much-needed capital for constructing competitive infrastructures and 
economies. It seems the Costa Rican success story is a textbook example, 
and certain circumstances played a decisive role in the outcome.  
 Important factors influenced Intel's decision to select Costa Rica, chief 
among which were: 1) the highest GDP per capita in the region, 2) a his-
tory of democracy and respect for the rule of law, 3) a relatively well-
                                                          
9New Mexico, Arizona, Texas and Oregon.  
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developed infrastructure in communications, transportation, roads, educa-
tion and other services, 4) a well-educated workforce, 5) a central loca-
tion for shipping in any direction, with access to coastline on both the 
eastern and western shores, 6) low cost structure for land, human re-
sources and services, 7) a transparent economy, and 8) a free-trade zone, 
an industrial park, launched by the government. 
GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS 
 Costa Rica is located in a centralized position vis-à-vis the north-south 
corridor as well as along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This alone, an 
arbitrary and fortuitous fact, helped to dissuade Intel from Chile. Fur-
thermore, the country has the highest percentage of European blended 
Mestizo population in Latin America. No other country in the region can 
even approximate their 94% white European dominance.  
 Human capital is a major asset for the country, rivaling levels of major 
industrialized countries. A 94.8% literacy rate couples with a particularly 
high proportion of skilled workers, unrivalled in Central America (see 
―Background Notes‖). The uniquely educated workforce explains 1995 
figures for the distribution of the 1.2 million person workforce: 45% in 
services, 22% in agriculture, and a rising 17% in industry.  
 These figures indicate an uncommon trend in Costa Rica in compari-
son to its northern neighbors, where the economies tend to be excessively 
dependent on agriculture and an indigenous Amerindian, agro-based la-
bor force. Prior to Intel's arrival in 1995, Costa Rica had already begun 
the strategic shift toward diversification of its economy into services and 
industry (―Costa Rica‖).  
 Beginning in the 1980s, while its Central American neighbors were 
mired in civil wars, the country attracted numerous US retirees who 
moved to the beautiful, cheap and comfortable coastline. The high per-
centage of white Europeans as well as English-speakers makes living in 
Costa Rica almost like being in the states and not quite so ―Spanish‖ or 
―foreign‖. The amenities most US households and corporations take for 
granted, like running water, cable TV, and continuous electricity flow, are 
available in this tropical paradise whose standard of living surpasses any 
other in the region and begins to approximate that of the US. Retirees 
tend to appreciate the political and economic stability of the country, 
knowing that the costs are less than in the US, yet the infrastructure guar-
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antees near US quality in banking, housing and other aspects of the infra-
structure and economy—and at half the cost. 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT ISSUES 
 In the latter part of the twentieth century Costa Rica served as a cata-
lyst for economic reform in the Latin American region. Association in 
several key organizations has augmented this preeminent role as promoter 
of economic stability. Membership in the UN, the OAS (Organization of 
American States), and non-political observer status in ALADI (Associa-
tion of Latin American Integration), as well as its role as a principal play-
er in the MCCA (Common Market of Central America) demonstrate the 
country's commitment to the economic sector. 
 In 1999, foreign trade exports of $6.6 billion included electronic com-
ponents, bananas, coffee, textiles and apparel, fruits, jewelry and flowers. 
Major market receptors of these goods were the US (51%), Europe 
(23%), Central America (11%), and Japan (2%). On the import side, a 
total of $6.3 billion came from the US (56%), Europe (10%), Mexico 
(5%), Central America (5%), Japan (5%) and Venezuela (4%). Imports 
included electronic components, machinery, vehicles, consumer goods, 
chemicals, petroleum products, foods and fertilizers (see ―Background 
Notes‖). A key challenge for Costa Rica is to reduce its trade dependence 
on foreign countries for the expensive high-tech imports and create a lo-
cal industry in these superior value sectors. This can occur only if indi-
genous industries result from spillover through foreign investment 
projects, such as Intel. 
 In the 1980s high-tech companies informally began to select the Cen-
tral American country. Motorola, one of the first, set up a components 
plant for cellular phones and by 1998 employed over 1,200 workers. 
More than 30 other high-tech production plants are currently operating in 
Costa Rica. In 1997, 2% of the country's $4.8 billion in exports derived 
from these companies. If we contrast foreign firm's exports in 1997 at 
$115.3 million to Intel's output in 1998 of $700 million, we find an in-
creased overall exports to 17% (Balkin) and can understand the magni-
tude of this influence. 
 During the rigorous negotiations with Intel in 1995, the government 
designed attractive and favorable incentives to lure foreign direct invest-
ment. It offered to build a water facility specifically for Intel's exclusive 
use, grant expeditious approval for permits, allow an initial 8-year tax 
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exemption, subsequent 4-year 50% discount on taxes, and give bulk rates 
for electric power. In addition, imports of foreign raw materials received 
a 100% tax exemption to bolster development within the country. These 
kinds of inducements led to the initial $300 million investment, a ground-
breaking in April 1997,10 and eventual employment of 950 individuals. 
The cornerstone necessary for establishing a high-tech hub in the country 
was set.  
 The spillover from Intel's investments, combined with the govern-
ment's aggressive courtship of other companies, is evident in Costa Rica's 
continued ability to entice technology sector companies to invest in the 
country. The cluster includes other multinational electronics firms which 
followed Intel's investment lead, like Taiwanese Acer, and German Veba, 
AG. Furthermore, companies in other industries are also taking advantage 
of what Costa Rica offers, since Proctor and Gamble and Abbott Pharma-
ceuticals have opened up sites there too (Sowinski). A host of companies 
offering complementary services to Intel have emerged. For example, 
Photocircuits in 1998 announced plans to build a $30 million plant em-
ploying over 700 people to produce closed circuit cards for Intel and oth-
er electronics firms. DEK USA and EMC Technology made similar over-
tures (Balkin). 
 The net effects of offering incentive packages may not be determined 
within the country until the first wave of tax-exemptions expire in 2005, 
although the GDP thus far is heavily tied to Intel's production output. 
Recent data links growth in GDP of almost 8% in 1999 to the inception 
of the Intel plant's production. Moreover an increase in chip exports to a 
level of $2 billion induced the first trade surplus since 1986. Projections 
assume that once the plant reaches full capacity at the end of 2000, the 
economy's rate of growth will plunge, some predict to 4% (Sowinski).  
 Correlated with this dismal picture of dependency is the 1999 national 
income growth measures (as opposed to GDP) that grew by only 2%, 
because of the outflow of profits (see ―Chip shop afire‖). According to 
Sowinski, Intel is responsible for half of the country's GDP growth in the 
last two years, and 37% of Costa Rica's exports.  
                                                          
10Intel in Costa Rica originally needed to import 90% of supplies from abroad because the 
country did not have an adequate infrastructure in place. In comparison, their flash memory 




 Within its borders, the establishment of a free-zone industrial area 
similar to the Singapore case model has been instrumental in enticing 
foreign direct investment. Coincidentally, Intel leverages its presence 
abroad by using local suppliers, and attracting other complementary 
companies to establish operations nearby. Every Fabrication plant built 
typically generates 20-25 suppliers. Originally Intel imported 90% of its 
supplies from abroad because Costa Rica lacked an adequate infrastruc-
ture. In comparison, its flash memory plant in Shanghai in 1996 bought 
80%of its materials from local suppliers. In Costa Rica near the A6/T6 
plant, 25 high tech companies, such as circuit board manufacturers and 
other complementary suppliers, have emerged. The growth and susten-
ance of these local indigenous suppliers is an objective Intel and Costa 
Rica can conjointly develop in the future. To exploit knowledge transfer, 
Intel could take a proactive role in nurturing local suppliers of comple-
mentary product lines.  
POLITICAL ISSUES 
 The political environment in Costa Rica has been characterized by 
stability for the past sixty years in a region plagued by civil wars from the 
1970s through the 1990s. Costa Rica eliminated its armed forces in 1948, 
maintaining only an internal force for domestic security. In 1993, it de-
clared permanent neutrality, and has upheld a strictly democratic tradition 
with a free-market economy throughout the twentieth century. While its 
neighbors experienced revolution (Nicaragua 1979), civil war (El Salva-
dor 1970-90), (Guatemala through the 1990s), and Manuel Noriega's nar-
co-regime (Panama through the 1980s), Costa Rica was forging a peace 
pact in 1987 for the region. The 1993 Nobel Peace Prize marks the epi-
tome of its efforts; Oscar Arias, ex-President, received the prize for bro-
kering the Central American peace plan.  
 Costa Rica’s role, unparalleled in the region, has been to pursue dem-
ocratic and economic development policies on the isthmus. Participation 
in the multinational Partnership for Democracy and Development in Cen-
tral America reflects the economic thrust of its agenda (see ―Background 
Notes‖). Indeed this economic focus has shielded the country from as-
suming a controversial role in the problematic political arena, and to date 
the most contentious function it performs is as a member of the UN Hu-
man Rights Commission. Costa Rica has sought concrete economic cohe-
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sion as paramount to its foreign policy initiatives, sidestepping overtures 
for political integration of the region. 
 The embedded democratic nature of institutions in the country guaran-
tees and imposes strict constitutional checks and balances. The political 
and judicial systems manifest transparency and a system of clear accoun-
tability, which reinforces a dependable regulatory regime. The superiority 
of this system was apparent in its competition with Mexico, for an Intel 
site, since the chipmaker, determined that the level of Mexican corruption 
impeded transparent transactions and made the country too complicated 
for conducting business. 
 The legitimacy of the legal and judicial system in Costa Rica attracted 
Intel from the start. In 1998, the Supreme Court approved the operation 
of high-voltage wires (230,000-volt lines) near the new plant, overturning 
a suit brought by local citizens against the company (see ―Czech Repub-
lic‖). As pointed out earlier, one of the incentives the government had 
offered was for fast-track approval of permits for the MNC. Thus legisla-
tive and judicial measures fostered and continue to encourage a favorable 
climate for foreign investment. 
CORPORATE ISSUES 
 It is difficult to ascertain to what degree Intel has created a worldwide 
corporate infrastructure of distributed yet specialized assets and capabili-
ties. Have they capitalized on knowledge flow and achieved knowledge 
transfer from the outside back to headquarters? There is no doubt that the 
company maximizes low cost competitive advantages in off-shore set-
tings. Furthermore, the method it followed in setting up the Costa Rica 
plant- though not the first of its kind abroad – suggests that they had al-
ready worked out a highly effective strategy for implementing global ex-
pansion. The deliberate and meticulous selection of Costa Rica as the 
ideal locale for promoting a technology hub in Latin America made via-
ble the exploitation of future cluster benefits.  
 On the other hand, research suggests that Intel locates manufacturing 
factories around the world in the most cost efficient countries, yet pro-
tects their core knowledge competencies by housing headquarters and 
primary research facilities in the centralized Silicon Valley technology 
cluster. Some research discusses the unique knowledge transfer qualities 
offered in the Israeli subsidiary, but most of the other offshore plants do 
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not reinforce the image of a corporation actively integrating processes 
from abroad. 
 In general, knowledge transfer occurs through the exploitation of hu-
man capital. By promoting individual managers from acquisitions or ro-
tating management physically around the globe, a corporation can 
achieve profitable knowledge integration. Reinhardt cites only three 
CEOs from acquisitions who wield positions in the top tiers of Intel man-
agement. Furthermore, although retention remains strong, at 96% per 
year, the greatest attrition occurs with the younger, midlevel managers. 
That segment tends to be innovative and aggressive, contributing to the 
flexibility of an organization, consisting of those who historically were 
key to Intel's initiation and success in the microprocessor market. 
 The effect of decentralization is that more knowledge flows between 
each division and the top. Also, the company can broaden the scope of 
their product portfolios, which in turn makes for a more flexible, cultural-
ly diverse organization. The rapid and expensive acquisitions in 1999 of 
twelve companies for approximately $6 billion, exceeding expenditures 
on capital equipment, demonstrates a commitment to invest in start-ups, a 
fact which should introduce new vigor into Intel. The objective is to in-
still an entrepreneurial spirit and integrate energy and creativity from 
these smaller companies. 
 From the Costa Rican perspective, the incentives proposed by the 
country to lure Intel seem to have been good choices for the Costa Rican 
economy. Capital improvements in key areas of infrastructure, essential 
for Intel, brought derivative benefits to the Costa Rican citizens as well. 
Infrastructure growth, particularly in the area of roads, services and 
communications platforms support the foundation for the development of 
an electronic high-tech hub in Costa Rica.  
 Nonetheless the broader advantage for Costa Rica in terms of human 
resources suggests that valuable skills and knowledge will be transferred 
to the workers, enhancing their attraction to other high-tech firms. The 
spillover continues into the supply chain, bolstering local suppliers and 
the local economy, in theory. This in turn helps to cultivate overall cluster 
benefits, both for the foreign as well as domestic firms. Intel must capital-
ize on the spillover it fostered as well. 
 Costa Rica initially lured companies with generous incentive pack-
ages. The government is currently working to improve the over-burdened 
infrastructure by expanding the airport, building roads, and commencing 
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the privatization of the ICE, the state-owned electricity and telecommuni-
cations monopoly (see ―Chip Shop Afire‖). 
 From Intel's perspective, as the first mover in a new manufacturing 
area, it reaped huge profits. Low costs and efficient production cycles are 
two of the more obvious benefits. However Intel must integrate know-
ledge from the Costa Rica plant project and improve processes further. 
Since a cluster is truly evolving, Intel must organize itself in order to have 
a mechanism for transferring knowledge from this new hub back to the 
carefully guarded headquarters. This is the greatest challenge for firms 
utilizing offshore locations, as they have to maximize the knowledge 
transfer from those globally dispersed plants. By physically transferring 
managers around the world and promoting from outside its borders, the 
company can appreciate all of the advantages of this kind of international 
organization. 
 Finally, Intel can follow the model for expansion into Africa and East-
ern Europe, where costs are low and human resources are ready for train-
ing. Bulgaria, or one of the other centrally-located, ―less privileged as-
cending countries‖ hoping to join the EU by 2005, would serve as an 
excellent center and source for new plants and knowledge cultivation. 
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